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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
SHALAKO SHAWN PARKER, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 43363 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2014-16370 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Parker failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his unified sentence of six years, with two 
years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to grand theft? 
 
 
Parker Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Parker pled guilty to grand theft and the district court imposed a unified sentence 
of six years, with two years fixed.  (R., pp.59-63.)  Parker filed a Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.76-81.)  Parker filed a 
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notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.  
(R., pp.82-84.)   
Parker asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence because he “remained incarcerated in the Elmore 
County Jail where he has been unable to participate in rehabilitative programming.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.2-4.)  Parker has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a 
sentence.”  The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
 Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, 
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review 
the underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 
442 (2008).   
Parker did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case.  On appeal, he 
merely argues that the district court should have reduced his sentence pursuant to his 
Rule 35 motion because he was still being housed in the county jail, where he was 
“unable to participate in rehabilitative programming.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.3.)  The 
district court was aware, at the time of sentencing, that “its sentence impacts 
Department of Correction programming decisions.”  (R., p.78.)  Further, “alleged 
deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is an issue more properly framed for review either 
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through a writ of habeas corpus or under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.”  
State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520, 777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming 
district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion).  Because Parker presented no 
new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion 
that his sentence was excessive.  Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed 
to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 
motion.   
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Parker’s claim, Parker has still failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the district court’s 
Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  
(Appendix A.)    
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Parker’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
       
 DATED this 19th day of November, 2015. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_____________________________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of November, 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_____________________________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
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Plaintiff, CASE NO. CR-FE-2014-0016370 
vs. 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION 
SHALAKO SHAWN PARKER, 
Defendant. 
On March 4, 2015, the Court sentenced Shalako Shawn Parker on Count I. Grand TheO, 
Felony, LC. §§ 18-2403(1); -2407(1)(b), -2409, to an aggregate term of six (6) years, with a 
minimum period of confinement of two (2) years, followed by a subsequent indctcnninnte period of 
custody not to exceed four (4) years. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Court dismissed Count II. 
Parker's counsel, August Cahill, timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence 
pul'suant to Rule 35, I.C.R., on June IR, 2015. He requests a reduction of his sentence but makes no 
specific recommendation. 
Parker also reqi1ests a hearing and the Court denies his request in an exercise of discretion. 
I.C.R. 35 provides in part, as follows: "Motions to correct or modify sentences under this rule ... 
shall he considered and dctennined by the court without the admission of additional testimony and 
without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the cou11 in its discretion; .... 
The burden is on a defendant to prove a sentence is unreasonable. State v. Burnight, 132 
Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Furthe1more, a motion for reconsideration MUST be supported 
by new or additional information. It is not appropriate to simply rearguc the sentence. Thnt is not the 
purpose of a motion for reconsideration. 
A motion for reduction of a sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the comt. State v. Copenhover, 129 Idaho 494, 
496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996); State v. TJnnk, 127 Idaho J52, JSS, 900 P.2d 1363, 
1366 (1995); Srate v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318,319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION 
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Allbee, 11 S Idaho 84S, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct.App. I 989). Nevertheless, as 
discussed above, our Supreme Court has held that a defendant presenting a Rule 35 
motion must submit new or additional information in support of the motion, and 
an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion "cannot be used as a vehicle to 
review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new evidence." 
Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. Accordingly, because Shumway 
presented no new or additional evidence in support of his motion, we will not review 
the reasonableness of the sentence nor disturb the district court's order denying 
the motion. 
State v. Sh11mw<1y, 144 Idaho 580, 583, 165 P.3d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has made this clear. 
However, Rule 35 docs not function as an appeal of a sentence. Instead, it is a 
narrow rule allowing a trial court to correct an illegal sentence (at any time) or to 
correct a sentence imposed iJ1 an illegal maimer (within 120 days) .... When 
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show thnt the sentence is 
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the 
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion. Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320, 144 
P.3d at 25; State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3<l 956, 974 (2003); Stale v. 
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 463, 50 P.3d 472, 478 (2002); see also State v. Wright, 134 
Idaho 73, 79, 996 P.2d 292, 298 (2000). An appeal from the denial of a Ruic 35 
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the 
presentation of new infom1ation .... 
State v. Hiiffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838,840 (2007)(emphasis added). 
In this case, Parker presents no new information. He argues that his mother has health 
problems. However, this is not new information. The Court considered both his mother's health and 
her comments at sentencing. It is not new information to observe that an i1unate may not be 
immediately eligible for the work center or that the sentence impacts his eligibility for specific 
programs. The Court was, and is, aware its sentence impacts Dcpa11mcnt of Correction programming 
decisions. 
ANALVSIS 
Parker requests leniency because his mother is ill and he want~ to participate in rehabilitative 
programs. The Court rejects his request. Rule 35, I.C.R., provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(M)otions to correct or modify sentences under this rnle must be filed within 120 days 
of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction 
and shall be considered and detennined by the court without the admission of 
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless othcrwiiie ordered hy the court 
in its discretion; .... 
26 ORDER DENYING RULE 3S MOTION 
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The determination of whether to grant the relief requested by Parker is a matter committed to the 
Court's discretion and the Court's decision is governed by the same standard as the original sentence. 
See Slate v. Gardiner, 127 ldaho 156, 164,989 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ricks, 120 Idaho 
875 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In this review, this Court has employed the standards set forth in State v. 
Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Court understood that this was a matter of discretion and considered several factors both 
in tht: original sentencing and in deciding this Motion for Reconsideration. A sentence has several 
objectives: (l) protection of society, (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) 
possibility of rehabilitation, and (4) punishment for wrongdoing. The primary consideration is, and 
should be, "the good order and protection of society." State v. Toohi/1, l 03 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 
(Ct. App. 1982). 
In any sentencing, the primary focus begins with a concern for protection of the public. In this 
case, Parker pied guilty to Count I. Grand Theft, Felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(l)(b), -2409. The 
Court imposed an aggregate term of six (6) years, with a minimum period of confinement of two (2) 
years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed four (4) years. The 
maximum penalty for this offense is fourteen (14) years. The fixed portion of a sentence imposed 
under the Unified Sentencing Act is treated as the tem1 of confinement for sentence review purposes. 
State v. Hayes, 123 Idaho 26, 27, 843 P.2d 675,676 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court finds that a two (2) 
year fixed sentence for Urand Theft is lenient considering the facts of this crime: an<l Parkt:r's 
criminal history. It is well within the statutory sentence guidelines. Furthermore, the Court 
considered the entirety of the sentence, including any indetenninate time. 
In arriving at this sentence, the Cou1i considered Parker's character and any mitigating or 
aggravating factors. The Court, however, found there were several aggravating factors in this case -
suggesting the need for this sentence. In particular, it is clear that Parker needs incarceration. The 
Court's decision focused on rehabilitation and protection of society. Parker's criminal history 
suggested the need for this sentence in order to properly rehabilitate him. 
This was his third felony conviction. He has been convicted of felony Witness Intimidation 
(2008) and felony Injury to Jail (2014). 
26 ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION 
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Parkel''s extensive misdemeanor conviclion1 record in~lu<l~s D.U.I. (2014), Driving Without 
Privileges/No License/Invalid License (2003, 2007, 2008, 2014), inattentive Dtiving (20142). Petit 
Theft (2006), Battery (2003, 2004, 2006), Domestic Assault (2005), Domestic Assault in Presence of 
a Child (2005, 2008), Use of Telephone to Harass (2004), Resisting and Obstruction (2003), 
Trespass (2005), and contempts, probation violations, and failures to appear. As a juvenile beginning 
when he was 13, he incurred juvenile charges of Battery (2001), Resisting Officers, Minor in 
Possession of Alcohol (2002. 2003), and Driving Vehicle Without Owner's Consent (amended from 
Burglary). 
Since he was 13 years old, Parker has been incarcerated for all but 6 of those years. 
In this case, he stole a disabled person's pick-up with all its belongings, including a debit 
card which he used. While he was incarcerated at the Ada County Jail on this charge, he worked his 
way out of belly chains and swung them at the jail window, cracking it. He then threatened another 
inmate and attempted to throw an unknown liquid at that inmate. When he was handcuffed, he 
refused to allow the deputies lo remove those handcuffs and then "slipped" them. Parker again used 
those handcuffs to break the window. 
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This was not the first time he acted out while incarcerated. The Court had previously retained 
14 jurisdiction and Parker acted out while he was on that retained jurisdiction. Ultimately the 
15 department of corrections recommended the Court relinquish jurisdiction, which it did. On other 
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occasions Parker received ve1y significant disciplinary sanctions. He threatened staff, flooded his 
cell, disrespected staff, mutilated himself, refused orders, threatened other inmates, and incurred 
many other disciplinary incidents. 
The Court finds that this sentence folfills the objectives of protecting society and achieves 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution, and therefore denies Parker's Motion for Reconsideration. 
11' IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this 22nd day of June 2015. 
~C.~ 
Cheri C. Copsey, Dis;J;/J-u~g~(T 
1 Numerous cases were dismissed as purt of plcn ngrccmcnts, including felony Attempted Strangulation. 
1. Am1:ndcd from leaving the scene of accident. 
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